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Abstract
This paper evaluates monetary policy rules in a business cycle model with stag-
gered prices and wage setting a la Calvo and asymmetric information in the credit
market. Rules are compared in a utility based welfare metric, the effects of the
model’s nonlinear dynamics are captured by a quadratic approximation to the pol-
icy function. The ﬁrms net worth crucially affects the terms of obtaining outside
ﬁnance. Financial frictions dampen the economy’s response to shocks and make
them more persistent. For the baseline calibration, the welfare costs of price stick-
iness are found to be less than 0.04 per cent of steady state consumption. However,
wage stickiness can induce welfare costs of up to 0.85 per cent of steady state con-
sumption. An interestraterulethatplaceshighweightonstabilizing wageinﬂation
can eliminate most of these costs. These ﬁndings are by and large independent of
the existence of other real distortions in the model, namely credit frictions.
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11 Introduction
The literature on optimal monetary policy is huge. The seminal works by Rotemberg
and Woodford (1999) have built a foundation for monetary policy analysis based on
completely speciﬁed models with optimizing, forward looking ﬁrms and households
and infrequent price adjustment. This framework allows to derive model consistent
objectives for the central bank from the preferences of the agents and the constraints
imposed by the model. Woodford (2003) shows that for a particular class of models,
the central bank’s problem of welfare maximization can be reduced to a constrained
minimization of variances of inﬂation and a properly deﬁned output gap term. The con-
straints are given by the linearized equilibrium conditions of the model economy. Such
a framework essentially allows to operate within the framework of linear-quadratic
control, optimal monetary policy can be easily characterized.
It is well known that the aforementioned methodology is limited to a restricted class
of models. Special assumptions are needed to ensure that the central bank’s objective
is free of ﬁrst order terms, as these terms may introduce a bias when evaluated using a
ﬁrst order approximation to the policy function.1 The bias may arise, since these terms
are independent of policy when evaluated by use of linear policy function, but in fact
depend on higher order terms in the approximate policy function. Among these special
assumptions are an output subsidy that ensures that the steady state level of output is
efﬁcient (despite the presence of monopolistic competition in the goods market), and
the absence of capital accumulation. Clearly, these assumptions rule out the analysis
of models that feature several non-monetary distortions and incorporate aspects that
improveamodelsﬁtwiththedata, suchascapitaladjustmentcosts, orvariablecapacity
utilization.
However, recent advances in numerical methods allow to analyze welfare effects of
monetarypolicyrulesforalargerclassofmodelsbydepartingfromthelinearquadratic
framework through second order Taylor approximations to the policy functions. This
paper uses the numerical procedures and MATLAB code provided by Schmitt-Groh´ e
and Uribe (2004) to evaluate the welfare effects of different monetary policy rules in
realistic dynamic general equilibrium model. The main characteristics of this model
are staggered price and wages setting, capital accumulation as well as informational
frictions in the credit market.
The objective of this paper is to quantify the welfare effects of different versions of
Taylor rules as well nominal income targeting rules. The paper is organized as follows.
Section 1 derives the models equilibrium conditions. Subsequently, the models main
effect of credit frictions on the model’s dynamics is illustrated via impulse-response
analysis. In section 3, the solution method and the welfare measure are described.
Section 4 presents the welfare effects of monetary policy rules for various degrees of
nominal rigidities and credit frictions. Finally, section 5 concludes.
2 The model
The model is an extension of Carlstrom and Fuerst (2000) to include nominal wage
and price stickiness. Carlstrom and Fuerst (2000) incorporate an asymmetric infor-
mation problem between borrowers and lenders into a standard business cycle model
1Sometimes it is possible to eliminate these ﬁrst order terms by approximating a small number of equi-
librium conditions to second order. Whenever this is possible, there is no need to compute a second order
approximation to the policy functions.
2with money. Before going into detail, ﬁgure 1 sketches the economy’s structure and
serves as a road map for the future exposition. Households work, consume and lend
Figure 1: Graph of the model
WHOLESALE GOOD FIRMS
− competitive output market
− idiosyncratic productivity
RETAIL GOODS FIRMS








   lending
repayment?
   sell final good 
Profits
funds to ﬁrms. The borrower-lender relationship is characterized by asymmetric infor-
mation about idiosyncratic ﬁrm productivity. The production structure has three levels
as shown in the graph. At the lowest level, a continuum of ﬁrms produce a homo-
geneous wholesale good. The asymmetric information problem takes place between
entrepreneurs and households at this level. The wholesale good is used as input of pro-
duction by a continuum of imperfectly competitive ﬁrms that set price in a staggered
fashion at the second level. Finally, a competitive bundler aggregates these interme-
diate varieties into the ﬁnal output goods, which can be used for consumption and
investment. This structure is designed to keep the asymmetric information problem
separate from the price stickiness, following Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (2000).
The set up of the model will be explained in more details in the next subsections.
2.1 Household
A cashless limit of a money in the utility function framework a la Woodford (2003) is
considered. Since money plays no role in the money in the utility function framework
other than to back out the money supply that supports a given interest rate, this can
be seen as an innocuous simpliﬁcation. Households are inﬁnitely lived, supply labor
N and receive real wage w, consume ﬁnal goods C, rent capital goods K to ﬁrms at
the real rental rate r. Furthermore, they hold government bonds B and receive proﬁts
Π from the monopolistic retailers. The utility function is assumed to be separable in











+ wtNt(h) + Πt(h) + (1 + rt)Kt(h) − Kt+1(h).









UC(Ct(h)) =Etβ{(1 + rt+1)UC(Ct+1(h))}. (2.2)
Although households also lend to ﬁrms, lending does not appear in this budget con-
straint. It is assumed to be intra-period. This assumption is made in order to facilitate
comparison with the model of Carlstrom and Fuerst (2000).
The framework for motivating wage rigidities is standard. A continuum of house-



















Nominal rigidities are introduced according to the Calvo (1983) speciﬁcation. With
constant probability θw a randomly chosen household is allowed to re-optimize its
nominal wage in a given period. We add backward looking components into wage set-
ting following Gali and Gertler (1999). There are two types of wage setters, that differ
only in their behavior when receiving a signal to re-optimize the wage. A fraction of
households of measure ϕw is backward looking, the remaining households are forward
looking. A forward looking households that receives a signal to re-optimize its price,
maximizes expected utility through choice of the nominal wage subject to the demand
















As is well known, this condition implies that nominal wages are front loaded. Since
prices are ﬁxed with certain probabilities in futures periods, expectation of future price
levels as well as marginal rates of substitution inﬂuence current wage setting.2














Lt and VN(Nt(h))t = −vNt(h)λ
as well as UC(Ct(h)) = C−τ
t this condition can be expressed in terms of the optimal
2Since households set different nominal wages, they will generally supply different amounts of labor and
receive different wage income. Typically, the existence of a complete contingent claims market is assumed
in order to be able to ensure equality of consumption across households. Such a market is implicitly assumed
in this paper as well, although not modeled explicitly.
4nominal wage W∗
t (we focus on a symmetric equilibrium and henceforth drop the index



































In order to apply the MATLAB routines provided by Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe
(2004) it is necessary to cast the ﬁrst order condition for wage setting in a companion
form, i.e. involving only variables dated t + 1 and t. We express the Calvo wage
setting condition in terms of the aggregate real wage wt, the optimal real wage for
optimizing ﬁrm w∗
t and CPI inﬂation πt instead of nominal wage and the price level in





























The ﬁrst-order condition then reads Bt = κv












































































































3As is standard in the literature, the assumption of a complete contingent claims market ensures that all
household consume the same amount, despite their different wages income.
5A backward looking households that receives a signal in period t to change its wage
sets Wb
t−1 as a geometric average of the wages posted in the last period adjusted for








Deﬁning lower case variable as their upper case counterparts, divided by the price level












= (1 − θw)(1 − ϕw)(W∗
t)







Dividing through by Pt, one obtains the evolution of the aggregate wage index in real
terms
w1−κ
t =(1 − θw)(1 − ϕ)(w∗
t)













The economy has three different layers of production. At the lowest level, a contin-
uum of ﬁrms produce a homogeneous wholesale good. This good is used as input of
production by a continuum of imperfectly competitive ﬁrms at the second level. These
ﬁrms buy the wholesale good and costlessly differentiate it into an intermediate good
of variety j. A competitive bundler aggregates these intermediate varieties into the
ﬁnal output goods, which can be used for consumption and investment. At the whole-
sale goods level, there is an asymmetric information problem between borrowers and
lenders. At the intermediate goods level, there is imperfect competition and asynchro-
nized price setting. Following Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (2000), this layered
production structure is designed to separate the agency problem from price stickiness,
which facilitates aggregation in this model.
2.2.1 The asymmetric information problem
Since the ﬁrms’ problems are static, time subscripts are suppressed for the ease of
expositioninthissubsection. Thereisacontinuumofﬁrmswithunitmassindexedbyi.
Each ﬁrm is owned by an inﬁnitely lived entrepreneur, who has a probability γ of dying
in each period. The production function F(Ki,Li) for the wholesale good YW displays
constant returns to scale in labor Li, and capital Ki. The idiosyncratic productivity ωi
has distribution function Φ(ωi) and density function φ(ωi) with nonnegative support
and mean of unity.
YW
i =ωi · A · F(Ki,Li) (2.12)
4Throughout this paper, the timing notation is as follows. All variables are subscripted with time when
they are known, i.e. predetermined variables are denoted with t − 1.
6Assumption 1. Lender and borrower contract after the realization of aggregate uncer-
tainty A and before the realization of idiosyncratic uncertainty ω. Once realized, ω is
private information of the entrepreneur. The lender’s cost of verifying ω is a fraction
µ of the ﬁrm’s output.
A denotes the level of technology, which is common across all entrepreneur, aggre-
gate total factor productivity. It is assumed that this variable is known to both lenders
and entrepreneurs at the time of the loan contract, which eliminates aggregate uncer-
tainty for the contracting problem. For simplicity of the exposition, this term is nor-
malized to unity in the subsequent paragraphs. It follows an AR(1) process in the
simulations. In order to generate a role for external ﬁnance, it is assumed that the ﬁrm
has to lay out its production costs before receiving the payment for the output good.
Let Xi ≡ wLi + rKi denote the cost for the input bill, determined by the real wage w
and the real rental rate of capital r as well as factor demands. The ﬁrm then borrows
Xi − Ni from a ﬁnancial intermediary. Here, Ni is the net worth of the ﬁrm i. For
convenience, it is assumed that borrowing is intra-period, so the relevant opportunity
cost for the household per unit of lending is one.
Assumption 2. There is enough anonymity in the credit market, such that agents can
only sign one period contracts.
The above assumption rules out reputation considerations and other aspects of long
term credit relationships. This is done for the sake of model tractability. Dynamic
credit relationships require the use of much more involved numerical techniques; they
also challenge the conclusion from one period models, see Smith and Wang (2000).
Since the realization of the productivity shock is private information of the ﬁrm and
veriﬁcation of the true productivity is costly to the lender, the ﬁrm has an incentive to
misreport its productivity.
The ﬁnding of Gale and Hellwig (1985) is that the optimal incentive compatible
contract with costly state veriﬁcation is risky debt. The authors characterized the con-
tract that maximizes expected entrepreneurs payoff subject to the risk neutral lender
breaking even in expectation.5 The contract requires a ﬁxed repayment when the ﬁrm
is solvent and allows the creditor to recoup as much of the debt as possible in case of
bankruptcy. The ﬂat payoff schedule in case of solvency follows directly from incen-
tive compatibility. Allowing the lender to seize all obtainable assets in case of default
minimizes the number of states in which monitoring must occur for the lender to break
even.
The contract is characterized by a non default value ¯ ωi, loan size Xi − Ni and an
implicit interest rate ˜ r. A ﬁrm with productivity ωi ≥ ¯ ωi is able to repay its obligation
(1 + ˜ ri)(Xi − Ni) and no monitoring takes place. The non default value is therefore
deﬁned by (1+˜ ri)(Xi−Ni) = ¯ ωiF(Ki,Li). For lower productivity, the ﬁrm defaults,
the lender monitors and seizes all of the projects output. The pair ( ¯ ωi,Xi), is sufﬁcient
for the description of the optimal contract, the interest rate follows immediately as 1+
˜ ri = ¯ ωiF(Ki,Li)/(Xi − Ni). The optimal ﬁnancial contract maximizes the expected
payoff for the borrower, subject to the participation constraint for the lender. Let PW
denote the nominal price of the ﬁrms output good and P the consumer price index. The
5The household is not risk-neutral, however without aggregate risk, he can perfectly diversify all the risk.
With aggregate risk, it remains to be shown that the ﬁrm absorbs all aggregate risk.
















PW (rKi + wLi − Ni)
(2.14)
The ﬁrm expects as residual income the conditional mean
E[(ωi − ¯ ωi)|ωi ≥ ¯ ωi]F(Ki,Li) when it is solvent and nothing otherwise. The lender
receives the negotiated repayment ¯ ωiF(Ki,Li) in states of solvency and expects a con-
ditional mean E[ωi|ωi ≤ ¯ ωi]F(Ki,Li) corrected for monitoring costs in states of








Here the term Si is given by:
Si ≡ 1 − µ

¯ ωiφ( ¯ ωi)
"R∞
¯ ωi ωiφ(ωi)dωi









Finally, the break even constraint holds with equality. Inspecting (2.15) and (2.16) re-
veals the crucial role of monitoring costs for the inefﬁciency of the economy. When
there are no monitoring costs (µ = 0), the usual efﬁciency condition holds in this
model: marginal product equals factor cost. Si is unity in this case. When monitoring
costs are strictly positive however, the economy is distorted. Real marginal product is
above the real wage, Si is below unity. Note, that Si must be strictly below one with
positive monitoring costs, otherwise revenues would be exhausted by factor payments
alone and monitoring costs could not be covered. However, the inefﬁciency goes fur-
ther than that. Entrepreneurs are making positive proﬁts, revenues are strictly higher
than factor payments plus monitoring costs. The ﬁrm would like to expand production,
but is not able to obtain further external ﬁnance.
2.2.2 A note on aggregation
Remark 1. In order to ﬁnd the model solution it is not necessary to keep track of the
distribution of net worth of the entrepreneurs, the means are a sufﬁcient statistic.
Entrepreneurs are identical ex-ante with respect to their expected productivity, but
heterogeneous ex-post once idiosyncratic productivity has materialized. Therefore,
evenwhenstartingwithidenticalinitialendowmentofwealth, overtimetheentrepreneurs
will have different levels of wealth. Thanks to linear monitoring technology and con-
stant returns to scale in production, this heterogeneity does not require to keep track of
the distribution of wealth as a state of the system.
First note from (2.15) and (2.16) that the ratio of marginal products of capital and
labor are equal for all ﬁrms. This implies for linear homogeneous production functions
such as the Cobb-Douglas, that the capital-labor-ratios are equal across ﬁrms. But
8the capital-labor-ratio uniquely determines the marginal product of a factor with linear
homogeneity, which implies that marginal products are equal across ﬁrms and therefore
Si is independent of i. One can conclude from (2.17) that ¯ ω must be independent of i.
The lender break even constraint (2.14) can be rearranged to show that all ﬁrms must











¯ ωφ( ¯ ω)
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¯ ω ωφ(ω)dω






The essential terms of the debt contract, leverage and cutoff value are thus equal across
ﬁrms. It follows that the FOC for the optimal contract also hold for aggregate variables,
deﬁned as the integral over all i variables. Subscripts i are therefore dropped in what
follows. Call the right hand side of (2.18) Ψ( ¯ ω), the projects leverage is given by:
Xi
Ni
= [1 − Ψ( ¯ ω)]
−1 (2.19)
2.2.3 The retailer
A continuum of retailers on the unit line, indexed by z buy the entrepreneurs’ wholesale
good at price PW
t and costlessly differentiate it into a good of variety z.
Standard Calvo pricing is assumed in goods market just as it was in the labor mar-
ket. We add backward looking components by following Gali and Gertler (1999).
There are two types of ﬁrms, that differ only in their pricing behavior when receiving
a signal to re-optimize. A fraction of measure ϕ is backward looking, the remaining
ﬁrms are forward looking. A forward looking ﬁrm that receives a signal to re-optimize





















































Pt and πt,t+s ≡ πt+1 ...πt+s (with πt,t ≡ 1), the Calvo













































































These two equations together with −1
 = Nt
Dt allow the pricing condition to be written
in companion form, as needed by the MATLAB codes.
A backward looking ﬁrm that receives a signal in period t to change its price Pb
t−1



















t−1 + (1 − θ)(1 − ϕ)(P∗
t)








Dividing by Pt, we have that
1 = θπ−1+
t + (1 − θ)(1 − ϕ)(p∗
t)






2.2.4 Final goods production
























The ﬁnal output good may be consumed by households C, by entrepreneurs CE, or be
used for investment I.
Yf
t = Ct + CE
t + It (2.31)
102.3 Aggregation














We have the following relation between aggregate factor inputs Kt, Lt and aggre-
gate output Yt.
Proposition1(followingChristiano, Eichenbaum, andEvans(2001)). UnderCalvo-
pricing, aggregate output is related to aggregate factor input through a measure of























fraction of price setters that receive a signal to re-optimize its price is randomly cho-
sen and by the law of large numbers, we have the following recursion for the price
dispersion index







































In terms of stationary variables
˜ Pt =(1 − θ)(1 − ϕ)(p∗
t)






+ θπ˜ Pt−1. (2.34)
(Proof of Proposition 1). Since all intermediate good ﬁrms face the same relative
price of capital and labor, they choose the same capital to labor ratio. Hence, Y∗
t ≡ R1
0 Yt(z)dz = AtKα
t L1−α
t (neglecting monitoring costs for the moment). But from the











Ytdz = ˜ PtYt.
Solving for Yt and substituting Y∗
t = AtKα
t L1−α



























Assumption 3. With constant probability 1−γ, an entrepreneur dies in a given period.
Entrepreneurs can consume all their net worth just before death.
Thisassumptionallowstolimitthesizeofaggregatenetworthinaninﬁnitehorizon
set up. Since the return to internal funds is higher than that to the external funds, risk
neutral entrepreneurs want to postpone consumption, until they can self-ﬁnance their
entire project. To avoid the irrelevance of ﬁnancial frictions in the long run, exogenous
death probabilities are introduced. When an individual entrepreneur receives a signal
about his death he consumes all his net worth. Aggregate entrepreneurial consumption





(ω − ¯ ωt) (2.36)
The evolution of the borrowers net worth plays a crucial role for the dynamics of
the model. Net worth is determined as follows. Let Zt−1 denote the units of physical
capital owned by the entrepreneur at the beginning of period t. The entrepreneurs’ net
worth Nt is then simply deﬁned as the market value of Zt−1, where Zt−1 is equal to














(ω − ¯ ωt)dω − CE
t (2.38)
3 Model calibration and analysis
Most of the model’s parameter are calibrated to match certain time series averages
or set to standard values in the literature.6 The capital share in output α is standard
0.36. The discount factor β is set to 0.99 as to induce a steady state real interest
rate of roughly 4 per cent on an annual basis. The depreciation rate is set to 0.02
corresponding to an annual rate of 8 per cent. The arrival rates of the signal to re-
optimize prices and wages,θ and θw are both set to 2/3, implying an average duration
of price and wage contracts of 3 quarters. This choice is roughly consistent with the
estimates in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2001) for US data, who ﬁnd θ = 0.5
and θw = 0.7. The intertemporal elasticity of substitution is set to unity, i.e. utility is
logarithmic in consumption.
6I am currently working on an estimation of the models parameters using Euro area data and the Max-
imum Likelihood approach following Ireland (2004). Preliminary result suggest a larger degree of wage
stickiness than price stickiness.
12The parameters governing monopolistic competition  and κ are set to 7 as to in-
duce in markup of 16.7 per cent, roughly consistent with the empirical estimates by
Basu and Fernald (1993) who report average markups in U.S. manufacturing close to
15 per cent. The autoregressive parameter in the law of motion for technology is set to
the standard 0.95 and σ = 0.007. The calibration of the key parameter characterizing
the credit frictions chosen to emphasize the effects of such frictions. Firms’ idiosyn-
cratic productivity is assumed to be uniformly distributed on the interval [0,2], which
allows to compute the relevant intervals analytically. The cost of state veriﬁcation µ,
which should be interpreted as a broad cost of bankruptcy is assumed to be 0.25 and
taken from Harrison, Sussmann, and Zeira (1999). The parameter γ, governing en-
trepreneurs’ consumption, is set as to induce a steady state default probability of 25 per
cent.
3.1 Ampliﬁcation and persistence?
Does the introduction of credit frictions lead to an ampliﬁed or dampened response of
the economy to technology and monetary policy shocks? Does it create endogenous
persistenceintothemodel, i.e. autocorrelationfunctionsofthemodels’variableswhich
are not inherited from the exogenous shocks? The response of aggregate output to a
technology shock is depicted in ﬁgure 2.

















































IRFs to technology shock
KEY PARAMETERS:
λ = 0, θ = θ
w = 0, κ = ε = 7




Figure 2: Response of output and net worth to technology shock
Credit frictions dampen the response of output to a technology shock and increase
persistence. This effect can be explained by the sluggish behavior of net worth. The
ﬁrm would like to increase employment of labor and capital, but the loan size is related
to net worth of the ﬁrm. However, net worth consists largely of proﬁts accumulated in
the past and cannot jump much on impact. It increases slowly and reaches its peak after
about 2 years. Output persistence in the credit friction model, measured by the half life
of the response on impact, is increased through credit frictions. However, the size
of this effect depends crucially on the wage elasticity of labor supply. To understand
13this, log-linearize the aggregate production function. On impact, the output response
to a percentage increase in technology equals unity stemming directly from technology
plus labor share α times the response in labor. If labor is supplied elastically, then
small ﬁnancial constraints in the ﬁrms ability to pay higher wages lead to relatively
large ﬂuctuations in labor employed. If labor is supplied very inelastically, then larger
variations in net worth are required to bring about a certain change in labor employed.
The above graph shows the extreme case λ = 0, i.e. constant disutility of labor.
4 Welfare measure and solution method
Since the model is built from ﬁrst principles, one can use the utility of the agents7
to construct a welfare measure rather than resorting to an ad hoc loss function as in
non-structural models.
Several authors have pointed to the pitfalls of using a linear approximation to the
policy function when evaluating a second order approximation to the utility function.
Kim and Kim (2003) have shown that such a procedure can result in a spurious reversal
of welfare comparison in international economics: Autarky appears preferable to full
risk sharing.
Essentially the problem is that some second order terms are included in the wel-
fare criterion while other are neglected. A second order approximation to the policy
function is used in this paper in order to avoid the bias in welfare comparisons of pol-
icy rules. The following subsections brieﬂy summarize the solution methods and the
employed welfare measure.
4.1 Model representation and form of the solution
To ﬁx notation, consider the generic representation for rational expectations models
introduced by Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2004)
Et f(yt+1,yt,xt+1,xt) = 0. (4.1)
f is a known function describing the equilibrium conditions of the model economy,
yt is a vector of co-state variables and xt a vector of state variables partitioned as
xt = [x1,t;x2,t]. x1,t is a vector of endogenous state variables and x2,t a vector of
state variables following an exogenous stochastic process
x2,t+1 = Lx2,t + ˜ Nσt. (4.2)
L and ˜ N are known coefﬁcient matrices, t is a vector of innovations with bounded
support, independently and identically distributed with mean zero and covariance ma-
trix I. σ is a parameter scaling the standard deviation of the innovations. The solution
to the model described by (4.1) is of the form
yt =g(xt,σ), (4.3)






7The subsequent optimal policy analysis neglects the utility of entrepreneurs and maximizes only the
utility of the households. This is done in order to facilitate comparison with a version of the model in which
are no credit frictions.
14Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2004) derive the second-order Taylor approximation to the
policy functions g(·) and h(·) and provide MATLAB codes for the numerical imple-
mentation. The approximate model dynamics obtained from their second-order ap-











H∗(xt ⊗ xt) +
1
2
hσ2 + σNt+1. (4.6)
Here, the vectors yt and xt denote deviation or log-deviation from the steady state. G
and H are coefﬁcient matrices representing the linear part of the Taylor approximation.
The matrices G∗ and H∗ form the second-order part jointly with the vectors g and h.
4.2 Unconditional welfare
A natural welfare measure for rankings of monetary policy that can be easily con-
structed from the second-order approximation is the unconditional expectation of pe-









where the unconditional expectation E averages across all possible histories of ag-
gregate shocks. The next paragraphs derive the formula for numerically computing
welfare given a second order approximation to the policy function.
The second-order approximation to an arbitrary objective function u(yt) of co-
states yt is







(yt ⊗ yt), (4.8)
such that upon taking expectations









Here, µy,Σy denote unconditional mean and covariance matrix of y, respectively.
To construct ﬁrst and second moments of the co-state variables assume covariance

















Note that while under the linear approximation unconditional means do not differ from
the steady state values, the second-order approximation is able to capture the effect of
variances on means. Since variances can be computed accurately up to second-order
from the linear part of the policy function, it is sufﬁcient to approximate vec(Σx +
µxµ0
x) ≈ vec(Σx) and vec(Σy + µyµ0
y) ≈ vec(Σy). It is then possible to construct
these using the simple formulas
vec(Σy) =(G ⊗ G)vec(Σx), (4.12)
vec(Σx) =σ2(I − H ⊗ H)−1(N ⊗ N)vec(I). (4.13)
15Given these approximations for the variances, the means can be computed from (4.10)
and (4.11). The described welfare measure has the following compact representation,
which can easily be veriﬁed by applying the rules of the partitioned inverse.



































The task of computing optimal monetary policy then amounts to numerically optimiz-
ing this welfare measure through choice of the coefﬁcients in the policy rule.
Remark 2. If the second order approximation to the welfare function can be rewritten
as to involve quadratic terms only, then linear and quadratic approximations to the
policy functions will yield the same level of welfare. I.e. up to second order, there is no
bias in welfare calculations based on linear policy rules.
The effect of the higher order terms of the model’s dynamics on the ﬁrst order terms
in the welfare criterion is the origin of the bias. Woodford (2003) carefully re-arranges
the second order expansion to the utility function as to eliminate the ﬁrst order terms.
Whenever such a procedure is possible, using a ﬁrst order approximation to the model’s
dynamics does not introduce a bias in welfare comparison.
When the model involves endogenous state variables or is not efﬁcient in the steady
state, it is often not possible to eliminate the ﬁrst order terms in the welfare criterion
and a higher order solution to the models dynamics is needed.
4.3 Rewriting the objective function
The average disutility from working − v
1+λ
R1
0 Nt(h)1+λdh depends on an appropri-
ately constructed measure of wage dispersion in the following way.








Starting from the demand function for variety h, integrating over h and using the deﬁ-











t dh = ˜ WtL1+λ
t . (4.15)
Since the fraction of wage setters that receive a signal to re-optimize its wage is ran-
domly chosen and by the law of large numbers, we have the following recursion for the
wage index
































16We obtain a formulation in terms of stationary variables





























4.4 Accuracy check: Inspection of Euler residuals
Judd(1998)advocatestheinspectionofEulerequationsresidualstoassesstheaccuracy
of the obtained solution. One plots the residual in the Euler equation as a function of
the state variables of the system. Let xt+1 = hs(xt) denote transition function for the
state variables obtained under solution method s and yt = gs(xt) the policy function
for time t decision variables. The residual arising from the Euler equation for capital
holdings is:
R
















The residual gives the error from following the approximated policy rule as a fraction
of current period consumption. Under certain conditions the approximation error of
the policy function is of the same order of magnitude as the Euler equation residual
as pointed out by Santos (2000). Figure (A) in the appendix plots the absolute value
of the consumption Euler equation residual obtained from the second-order accurate
solution method over a range of deviations of the state variables from −30% to +30%
from their steady state levels. The residual is expressed in base 10 logarithms for the
ease of visualization. 8 The maximum Euler residual is on the order of magnitude of
10−4. This may be interpreted as 10 cents error for every 100 $ spent. By comparision,
the Euler equation residual obtained from the ﬁrst order approximation is on average
an order of magnitude larger.
5 Welfare analysis of policy rules
The model outlined so fare features several real and monetary distortions. Price inﬂa-
tion is welfare reducing since the dispersion of relative nominal prices across retailers
leads to a dispersion of relative quantities demanded by the bundler. Under the efﬁcient
allocation relative quantities are equal to unity, essentially since all the retailer face the
same production function and the same demand function. The welfare costs of a given
amount of price dispersion is crucially related to the price elasticity of demand . The
stronger the degree of substitutability among varieties, the larger is the resulting quan-
tity dispersion resulting from price dispersion. Up to a log-linear approximation, price
dispersion and quantity dispersion are proportional with the factor of proportionality
8The expectation is computed using Gaussian quadrature with 10 nodes.
17being equal to  squared. Exactly the same argument applies to wage dispersion. Since
workers supply whatever amount of labor demanded by the bundler at the nominal
wage, the welfare costs are additionally inﬂuenced by the λ, determining the marginal
utility of labor. The higher λ, the higher the welfare costs of wage inﬂation.
In this section, the welfare effects of different interest rate rules are compared.
Initially, attention is restricted to a class of rules targeting wage and price inﬂation,
since these are most clearly related to welfare.
RN




Five different versions of these Taylor-type rules are considered: weak CPI inﬂation
targeting (χ0 = 1.5,χ1 = 0), weak wage inﬂation targeting (χ0 = 0,χ1 = 1.5),
weak CPI and wage inﬂation targeting (χ0 = 1.5,χ1 = 1.5), complete goods inﬂation
stabilization (χ0 = 10000,χ1 = 0), and complete wage inﬂation stabilization (χ0 =
0,χ1 = 10000). Whereas this choice of policy rules considered is somewhat arbitrary,
it is chosen for tractability.9
Welfareeffectsofpolicyrulesarecomparedaspercentagepointsofequivalentvari-
ation of steady state consumption. What percentage of consumption in a deterministic
version of the model must an agent be given in order to achieve the same level of wel-
fare as in a particular rule under consideration? If the utility in a deterministic version
of the model is VA and consumption and labor supply under the rule B are CB
t and LB
t ,
then the required percentage variation in consumption ψ is deﬁned by the relation:
VB =VA((1 + ψ)CA
t ,LA
t ) (5.2)
For the log utility speciﬁcation in this paper, we have VB = log(1+ψ)+VA It follows
that ψ = exp(VB−VA)−1. Whereas a number of authors such as Schmitt-Groh´ e and
Uribe (2003) and Kim and Kim (2003) argue against the use of an unconditional wel-
fare measure, this paper ﬁnds virtually no differences in the level of welfare computed
from unconditional expectation of period utility or from the expectation of discounted
expected lifetime utility conditional on initial values for mean and variance of the state
vector. 10 The welfare analysis of policy rules begins by considering a baseline model
with staggered price and wage setting, but no asymmetric information problem. In the
subsequent subsection, credit frictions are added. In the current version of the paper,
we condider only forward looking price and wage setting. 11
5.1 A baseline model without ﬁnancial frictions
Inspection of table 112 shows that weak CPI inﬂation targeting entails the largest and
signiﬁcant welfare costs. 13 Weak targeting of both wage and price inﬂation can im-
prove welfare by roughly three quarters of a percentage point of period consumption
9A search for the optimal rule through choice of χ0 and χ1 is difﬁcult, since the welfare surface is very
ﬂat in many regions.
10The initial mean and covariance matrix are set to zero, implying that the initial is the deterministic steady
state of the model.
11An extension to the general case of forward and backward looking price and wage setting is work in
progress.
12std refers to the unconditional standard deviation of a variable.
13Welfare in the baseline model absent any nominal rigidities (θ = θw = 0) is 0.0273. This implies that
the welfare costs of nominal rigidities are roughly 0.85 percentage points of consumption. Note that welfare
costs expressed not expressed in decimal notation, i.e. 1 is only 1 per cent.
18relative to weak CPI inﬂation targeting. Completely stabilizing CPI inﬂation entails
considerable welfare costs of one third of a percentage point of period consumption,
it improves welfare relative to targeting CPI inﬂation only weakly. From the results
of the next table we will see that this is mainly due to the reduction in the variance of
wage inﬂation. The next table shows that welfare costs of price inﬂation are by and
large negligible. Wage inﬂation is partially driven by price inﬂation, so that targeting
price inﬂation stronger improves welfare by its indirect effect on the variance of wage
inﬂation. Finally, the winner among the considered policy rules is complete wage in-
ﬂation stabilization. It can be seen that complete wage inﬂation stabilization results
in considerable variance in price inﬂation, but this does not seem to matter much for
welfare. Table 1 gives compensating variations (cv) for various scenarios relating to
the degree of backward-lookingness in price and wage setting denoted by I through
IV. Scenario I refers to the baseline case with purely forward-looking price and wage
setters (ϕ = ϕw = 0). II refers to the case of half of all price setters being backward-
looking and wage setters fully forward-looking (ϕ = 0.5,ϕw = 0). III is the bal-
anced case with 50 per cent of both wage and price setters being backward-looking
(ϕ = ϕw = 0.5). Finally, IV refers to price setters being fully forward-looking and
half of wage setters backward-looking (ϕ = 0,ϕw = 0.5). The standard deviations of
wage and price inﬂation refer to the baseline scenario I.
Table 1: Welfare effects of monetary policy rules in baseline model
χ0 χ1 std(π) std(πw) compensating variation
1.5 0 0.17 0.40 -0.82
1.5 1.5 0.15 0.12 -0.06
0 1.5 0.41 0.14 -0.13
10000 0 0.00 0.25 -0.35
0 10000 0.24 0.00 0.00
To isolate the effect of CPI inﬂation, table 2 reports welfare effects from a variant
of the baseline model, which features completely ﬂexible wages (θw = 0). In this
model, completely stabilizing the variance of price inﬂation is the welfare maximizing
policy rule, in fact it results in the same level of welfare as in the model without any
nominal rigidities. However, differences in welfare across any policy rule considered
are very small. Targeting only CPI inﬂation weakly, leads to a reduction in welfare
of only 0.004 percentage points of consumption. This ﬁnding is in line with a recent
paper by Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2003) also reporting negligible welfare differences
among Taylor rules in sticky price framework.
Since the welfare costs of CPI inﬂation are negligible, shutting of price stickiness
(θ = 0) in the baseline model should lead to similar welfare costs as in the model with
both types of nominal rigidities. This conjecture is conﬁrmed in table 3. The reason
that welfare of the sticky wage model and the sticky price model don’t always add up to
the welfare from the model with sticky wages and prices is that wage setting is different
when prices are also sticky but not perfectly stabilized.
195.2 The model with credit frictions
In this subsection, welfare is computed for the full model involving credit frictions as
well as staggered wage and price setting (θ = θw = 2/3).14 15 Results in table 4 show
that the basic conclusions from the analysis of the model without credit frictions still
hold. That is, complete stabilization of the wage inﬂation is still the winner among the
different policy rules considered. Targeting CPI inﬂation weakly still entails consider-
able welfare losses. However, it appears that the welfare costs of the different policy
rules relative to full stabilization of wage inﬂation are somewhat smaller than in the
case without credit frictions. The explanation for this is not yet obvious. However,
it is possible that to some extent the effect of credit frictions and wage inﬂation have
mutually offsetting effects.
14Welfare in the credit friction model absent any nominal rigidities (θ = θw = 0) is 0.026.
15Note that the steady state of the model with credit frictions is different from the one without credit
frictions.
20Table 2: Welfare effects of monetary policy rules in sticky price model
χ0 χ1 std(π) std(πw) compensating variation
1.5 0 0.11 0.72 0.0236
1.5 1.5 0.18 0.14 0.0152
0 1.5 0.41 0.18 -0.0284
10000 0 0.00 0.66 0.0273
0 10000 0.29 0.00 0.0000
Table 3: Welfare effects of monetary policy rules in sticky wage model
χ0 χ1 std(π) std(πw) compensating variation
1.5 0 0.16 0.37 -0.71
1.5 1.5 0.17 0.14 -0.10
0 1.5 0.58 0.14 -0.06
10000 0 0.00 0.25 -0.34
0 10000 0.66 0.00 0.03
Table 4: Welfare effects of monetary policy rules credit friction model with sticky
wages and sticky price model
χ0 χ1 std(π) std(πw) compensating variation
1.5 0 0.32 0.37 -0.69
1.5 1.5 0.29 0.11 -0.04
0 1.5 0.82 0.13 -0.24
10000 0 0.00 0.24 -0.27
0 10000 0.54 0.00 0.001
216 Conclusion
This paper has evaluated the welfare effects of 5 different Taylor type rules in a New
Keynesian model with staggered price and wage setting. A model consistent objective
for the central bank is derived from the utility of a randomly drawn household and
evaluated subject to a second-order approximation of the policy function. Consistent
with recent ﬁndings of Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2003) this paper ﬁnds negligible
welfare differences among different Taylor rules when only prices are set in a staggered
fashion. The maximum difference in welfare among the Taylor rules is roughly 0.05
per cent of period consumption.
However, wage stickiness may induce considerable differences among Taylor rules.
These differences can amount to up to 0.8 per cent of consumption. However these
costs can be largely eliminated by employing a Taylor type of rule that strongly targets
wage inﬂation. The reason is simple. Since CPI inﬂation has welfare costs that are
very very small, fully stabilizing wage inﬂation, which induces relatively large CPI
inﬂation, has small costs. This ﬁnding is consistent with papers such as Mankiw and
Reis (2002), who also point to a substantial weight for wage inﬂation in central bank
policy. Thisﬁndingisrobusttotheinclusionofotherrealfrictionssuchascreditmarket
imperfections into the model. However, a thorough investigation of optimal monetary
policy when credit markets are imperfect has not been conducted in this paper
Anumberofcaveatsneedtobenoted. Mostimportantly, whethernominalrigidities
in wage setting have strong allocational effects may be doubted. Recent research on
the welfare costs of wage stickiness when workers can choose their level of effort as in
Chang and Bills (2003) questions such large costs as found in this paper. Furthermore,
there is a large empirical debate over the relative importance of forward-looking versus
backwardlookingaspectsinpriceandwagesetting. EmpiricalmodelsofPhilipscurves
seem to perform poorly without the inclusion of backward looking terms. A more
general welfare analysis that takes into account backward looking components in wage
and price setting thus seems desirable in future research.

























































































Figure 4: Euler equation residual for the baseline model















t = (1 − θw)(1 − ϕ)(w∗
t)































































St = 1 − µ

¯ ωtφ( ¯ ωt)
"R∞
¯ ωt ωtφ(ωt)dωt














ωtφ(ωt)dωt + [1 − Φ( ¯ ωt)] ¯ ωt

Entrepreneurs:













(ω − ¯ ωt)
Market clearing:
Yt = Ct + CE
t + Kt+1 − (1 − δ)Kt
Yt = ˜ P−1
t YW
t
˜ Pt = (1 − θ)(1 − ϕ)(p∗
t)
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log(At+1) = (1 − ρa)log( ¯ A) + ρalog(At) + ut+1
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